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SYMPOSIUM: 50 YEARS WITH THE 25TH AMENDMENT 
THE ROLE OF THE WHITE HOUSE COUNSEL IN THE
TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT: ADVISING ON
PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY 
Nancy Kassop* 
Discussion of the Twenty-fifth Amendment often focuses on the 
actions of the President, the Vice-President, the Cabinet, and Congress in 
examining the drafting and the history of the amendment. However, when 
use of the amendment is under consideration, members of the White 
House staff also play important, advisory roles. Most prominently among 
those is the chief of staff to the President, but even more influential is the 
White House Counsel—a far less visible but key institutional player 
responsible for organizing and guiding the behind-the-scenes activity that 
occurs in the White House when the issue of presidential disability arises. 
The Counsel is often described as the lawyer for the institution of the 
presidency, separate and distinct from a President’s private attorneys.1 
Individual Presidents are temporary, short-term occupants of the office, 
and might, at some time, need the legal advice of a personal lawyer. The 
institution, however, endures long beyond any single occupant, and the 
Counsel’s two-fold task is to advise the President in his constitutional 
capacities while protecting the long-term prerogatives and institutional 
integrity of the office of the presidency. 
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New York at New Paltz. I appreciate the efforts of Professors Tracy A. Thomas and David B. Cohen 
and the joint sponsorship of the Center for Constitutional Law and the Raymond C. Bliss Institute of 
Applied Politics at the University of Akron for organizing the symposium on the Twenty-fifth 
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1. MaryAnne Borrelli, et al., The White House Counsel, Tʜᴇ Wʜɪᴛᴇ Hᴏᴜꜱᴇ Tʀᴀɴꜱɪᴛɪᴏɴ 
Pʀᴏᴊᴇᴄᴛ at 6, http://whitehousetransitionproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/WHTP2017-29-
Counsel.pdf [https://perma.cc/V6RR-DFPY]. 
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This article explores Section 3 of the Twenty-fifth Amendment, the 
part that provides a process for a President to determine that he is 
temporarily unable to carry out the duties of the office.2 
Government lawyers of all types have played a major role in the 
history of the Twenty-fifth Amendment, beginning with a proposal by 
Eisenhower’s Attorney General Herbert Brownell in 1957 and continued 
by his successor, William Rogers. Rogers was responsible for promoting 
early efforts to provide for an orderly course of action in cases of 
Presidential disability by facilitating an exchange of informal letters 
between a President and a vice-president, beginning with Eisenhower and 
Nixon, and followed by Kennedy and Johnson, Johnson and Humphrey, 
and even later presidential-vice presidential teams of George H.W. Bush 
and Dan Quayle, and Clinton and Gore.3 The White House Counsel, 
because of his proximity to the President and his institutional role of 
advising the President on constitutional matters, is at the center of 
orchestrating this exchange of letters between the two principals and of 
guiding the full process of the Twenty-fifth Amendment.4 
Much of the information for this article comes from personal 
interviews with past Counsels, conducted through the Presidential Oral 
History Project at the University of Virginia’s Miller Center of Public 
Affairs5 and the White House Transition Project.6 The White House 
Transition Project is an undertaking by a group of presidency scholars to 
smooth the transition to power for incoming White House staff members, 
most of whom have never served in a White House previously, and who 
often come straight off of the campaign trail and may be unfamiliar with 
the operations of government.7 Scholars have interviewed former staff 
members from the last seven administrations and have prepared briefing 
materials to give to the transition teams of both political parties during the 
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 3. 
3. Nancy Kassop, When Law and Politics Collide: Presidents and the Use of the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment, 35 Pʀᴇꜱɪᴅᴇɴᴛɪᴀʟ Sᴛᴜᴅ. Q. 147, 152 (2005).  
4. See President Donald J. Trump Announces Appointments for the Executive Office of the
President, Tʜᴇ Wʜɪᴛᴇ Hᴏᴜꜱᴇ, (Feb. 2, 2019), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-
actions/president-donald-j-trump-announces-appointments-executive-office-president-4/ 
[https://perma.cc/X6T6-5PTE] (Pat A. Cipollone currently serves as White House Counsel). 
5. Presidential Oral History Program, Uɴɪᴠᴇʀꜱɪᴛʏ ᴏꜰ Vɪʀɢɪɴɪᴀ Mɪʟʟᴇʀ Cᴇɴᴛᴇʀ ᴏꜰ Pᴜʙʟɪᴄ 
Aꜰꜰᴀɪʀꜱ, http://www.millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-oral-histories [https://perma.cc/
VLP2-YV8C]. 
6. White House Transition Project, Mᴏᴏᴅʏ Fᴏᴜɴᴅᴀᴛɪᴏɴ, 
www.whitehousetransitionproject.org [https://perma.cc/8U7E-KJ56]. 
7. See generally, White House Transition Project, (2018), 
http://www.whitehousetransitionproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/
Kumar_Assistants_to_the_President_Turnover_10-02-2018.pdf 
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presidential campaign and to a new President’s incoming White House 
staff members after the election to bring them up to speed on what they 
need to know as they begin their tenure in the White House. 
The Transition Project scholars recognized the need for this service 
to a new administration because the Presidential Records Act of 1978 
requires that an outgoing administration remove all records from the 
White House upon its departure and send them to the National Archives.8 
Consequently, incoming White House staff members enter offices that are 
completely empty—totally devoid of any records—with very few 
exceptions. One of those very rare exceptions happens to be a file 
containing documents with instructions on how the Twenty-fifth 
Amendment works.9 
One of the first acts a president-elect and his (and one day, her) 
spouse undertake is an extremely candid conversation with the White 
House Counsel, along with the Vice President-elect and his (or her) 
spouse, about the incoming President’s wishes, should any unexpected 
health issues arise that would affect his ability to carry out the duties of 
the office.10 
Thus, even before a new President takes office, he needs to plan for 
any eventualities that might stand in the way of his continuation in that 
office. Being forced to think about unpleasant circumstances that might 
lead you to lose your job prematurely may be an unpleasant task for any 
President to start work as the nation’s highest elected officer. But, a 
President is responsible for the continuity of government: the nation has 
placed its trust in this person to guarantee that there will always be 
constitutionally authorized officials in place to run the country. Thus, it is 
imperative that, to the degree possible, advance plans are in place that 
reflect a President’s choices, should such unpredictable circumstances 
arise. 
Fred Fielding, who served as White House Counsel to three 
Presidents, is an invaluable resource because he has actually guided 
presidents and executive branch officials in determining when to use the 
Twenty-fifth Amendment.11 His White House service began with a short 
stint at the end of the Nixon Administration, then serving for five years in 
the Reagan Administration at the time of the assassination attempt on 
Reagan, and then, returning to the Counsel’s office for the last two years 
of the George W. Bush presidency. His first-hand recollections of the 
8. 44 U.S.C. §§ 2201–2207. 
9. Borrelli, supra note 1, at 6-7. 
10. Id. at 25-26. 
11. Id. at 14. 
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emotionally fraught and chaotic moments immediately following the 
March 30, 1981 assassination attempt on Reagan are especially 
illuminating.12 
As Fielding describes it, upon hearing of the assassination attempt, 
the Cabinet and White House staff assembled in the Situation Room to 
follow the news from the hospital of the President’s condition.13 When he 
explained the provisions of the Twenty-fifth Amendment to the people in 
that room, “their eyes glazed over.”14 Most of them had no idea of what it 
was or how it worked. There was the infamous episode of Secretary of 
State Alexander Haig, running breathlessly into the White House Press 
Briefing Room, proclaiming he was “in control at the White House, 
pending the return of the Vice President.”15 Haig continued, 
“Constitutionally, you have the President, the Vice President, and the 
Secretary of State, in that order.”16 Secretary of Defense Weinberger 
challenged him, and claimed, instead, that the Secretary of Defense had 
command authority, thus, putting him in control.17 
Fielding explained that the current line of succession ran from the 
Vice President to the Speaker of the House, not the Cabinet, and that 
Weinberger was correct that, as they were in the Situation Room, which 
was a military command post, then, yes, military command authority does 
pass from the President directly to the Secretary of Defense, and, yes, 
Weinberger was in charge of the military while Reagan was unconscious 
at the hospital.18 
The file on the Twenty-fifth Amendment that is stored in the 
Counsel’s office for each new administration was compiled by Fielding 
as one of his first tasks in 1981 when he was Counsel for Reagan. He 
called it an “emergency manual that detailed every possible scenario that 
we could think of for presidential inability.” It had not been completed by 
the time of the assassination attempt, but the letters for Sections 3 and 4 
had been finished, and Fielding had those letters in his hand when he 
walked into the Situation Room on March 30 immediately following the 
shooting. The file has been in the Counsel’s office ever since.19 
12. Id. at 25-26. 
13. Fred F. Fielding, An Eyewitness Account of Executive “Inability,” 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 
823, 827 (2010).  
14. Id. 
15. Id. at 828. 
16. Id. at 826-28. 
17. Id. at 828. 
18. Id.
19. Id. at 828-29. 
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Boyden Gray, Counsel to George H.W. Bush, described the file as a 
“big decision tree”–that is, “what happens if X, then go to Y; if Z, then go 
back to A.”20 Lawyers in Fielding’s office who had been charged with 
thinking up different scenarios described their work as “making it up as 
we went along.”21 Fielding noted that once the book had been completed, 
he always carried one copy with him and left one copy back in the safe in 
the Counsel’s office at the White House. When he returned to the 
Counsel’s office years later in the Bush Administration, he was pleased to 
see that not only was the file still in the office, but it was in every 
emergency facility and also permanently on Air Force One and Air Force 
Two.22 
In turning to a fuller description of the role of the Counsel in the 
implementation of the Twenty-fifth Amendment as part of his or her 
official duties, it is necessary to understand that the Counsel needs to 
balance dual and, not infrequently, dueling (or, at least, conflicting) 
considerations: as the lawyer for the institution of the presidency, the 
Counsel’s primary responsibility is to insure that actions taken by a 
President are consistent with the Constitution and the laws. As a member 
of the White House staff, the Counsel must also be sensitive to the 
political needs of the chief executive for whom he or she serves. 
Consequently, the Counsel is likely to confront circumstances where 
political needs may conflict with legal or constitutional requirements. 
Thus, navigating a route that respects both may prove uncertain and 
challenging.23 
In interpreting and advising the President on implementation of 
Section 3 of the Twenty-fifth Amendment, it is inevitable that this classic 
and uncomfortable clash between politics and law will arise for the 
Counsel. No occasion can be more sobering than determining adherence 
to constitutional prescriptions during an unexpected and alarming event 
in the life of a President as well as assurance of a President’s continued 
political viability and continuity of service in the office.24 The Counsel is 
squarely in the middle of that dilemma, and it is his or her judgment that 
sets the tone for the activity that will unfold in its wake. 
And it is this dilemma—this clash of politics and law—that has 
produced the “paradox” of the Twenty-fifth Amendment. It is paradoxical 
because after taking more than a decade of work in the 1960s to finally 
20. Borrelli, supra note 1, at 25..
21. Id.; Kassop, supra note 3, at 156.
22. Fielding, supra note 13, at 828-29. 
23. Borrelli, supra note 1, at 28.
24. Id. at 63. 
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secure the amendment to provide for an orderly, temporary transfer of 
power when a chief executive’s state of health renders him incapable of 
governing, Presidents have often been resistant to using it at the very times 
when it is most needed. Two examples from Reagan will illustrate some 
of that reticence. 
Despite Fielding’s best efforts to educate Reagan officials about the 
Twenty-fifth Amendment in the immediate aftermath of the assassination 
attempt, it was never invoked at that time. The President’s staff and 
Cabinet members believed that executing a formal transfer of power, even 
if temporary, would signal a “perception problem” for Reagan.25 It could 
be viewed as a sign of weakness or loss of stature for the President. 
Attorney General Ed Meese went so far as to ask the Office of Legal 
Counsel in the Justice Department to provide a legal opinion on whether 
a President can delegate his powers during a temporary disability when 
“it is not considered necessary or appropriate to invoke the provisions of 
the Twenty-fifth Amendment.”26 
Thus, the Attorney General was looking for legal cover to justify a 
decision to refrain from using the amendment. Meese said that “the 
concern was that the press not get wind of any actions that would raise 
questions as to whether the President was capable of acting.”27 
And, yet, a young associate counsel in Fielding’s office, Christopher 
Hicks, recalled that the President was near death, and that it was a political 
decision to hide that from the nation. In Hicks’s words, “Meese, Chief of 
Staff James Baker, Deputy Chief of Staff Michael Deaver, and First Lady 
Nancy Reagan controlled the information they chose to give to the other 
administration officials.”28 
The day following surgery after the assassination attempt, Reagan’s 
staff determined that it would be a good photo op to reassure the nation to 
show him sitting in his hospital room, signing a bill.29 By that point, 
questions about invoking the Twenty-fifth Amendment were moot, and 
the issue was not raised again until four years later, when Reagan 
25. Kassop, supra note 3, at 157. 
26. Id. at 157-58. See Theodore B. Olson, Presidential Succession and Delegation in Case of
Disability, 5 Oᴘɪɴɪᴏɴꜱ ᴏꜰ ᴛʜᴇ Oꜰꜰɪᴄᴇ ᴏꜰ Lᴇɢᴀʟ Cᴏᴜɴꜱᴇʟ 91 (Apr. 3, 1981), also available at  L. Simms, 
Presidential Succession and Delegation in Case of Disability, Oꜰꜰɪᴄᴇ ᴏꜰ Lᴇɢᴀʟ Cᴏᴜɴꜱᴇʟ (Apr. 3, 1981) 
http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/twentyfifth_amendment_executive_materials/2 [https://
perma.cc/6CTY-FC8Y]. 
27. Kassop, supra note 3, at 156 (quoting Herbert Abrams, Tʜᴇ Pʀᴇꜱɪᴅᴇɴᴛ Hᴀꜱ Bᴇᴇɴ Sʜᴏᴛ: 
Cᴏɴꜰᴜꜱɪᴏɴ, Dɪꜱᴀʙɪʟɪᴛʏ ᴀɴᴅ ᴛʜᴇ 25ᴛʜ Aᴍᴇɴᴅᴍᴇɴᴛ ɪɴ ᴛʜᴇ Aꜰᴛᴇʀᴍᴀᴛʜ ᴏꜰ ᴛʜᴇ Aᴛᴛᴇᴍᴘᴛᴇᴅ Aꜱꜱᴀꜱꜱɪɴᴀᴛɪᴏɴ 
ᴏꜰ Rᴏɴᴀʟᴅ Rᴇᴀɢᴀɴ (W.W. Norton 1992)).  
28. Id. at 156. Phone interview with Hicks on file with author (July 23, 2004). 
29. Kassop, supra note 3, at 156. 
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underwent surgery for colon cancer.30 Because there was advance notice, 
Section 3 was relevant. But here, too, Reagan chose not to invoke the 
amendment directly but, rather, to take an alternative route. 
Although Fielding knew of Reagan’s preference, he drafted two sets 
of letters for the President, one that was a straightforward letter invoking 
Section 3, and a second letter that indicated that Reagan would abide by 
the procedures of the amendment without formally activating it.31 Think 
of this as “acting consistent with but not pursuant to” the amendment.32 
This is the same tactic that Presidents use when reporting to Congress on 
the deployment of military troops, where Presidents will follow the 
statutory procedures of the War Powers Resolution but will not 
acknowledge that they have formally activated the statute. In this way, 
they cannot be bound by the law’s restraints, and the President sets no 
precedent for official compliance with the War Powers Resolution. 
Similarly, Reagan chose this same parallel—but not official—route in his 
choice to abide by the procedures of the Twenty-fifth Amendment without 
formally invoking it.33 
In choosing the second of Fielding’s two options, Reagan provided 
congressional leaders with letters notifying them that he would, in fact, 
transfer power temporarily to the Vice President while he was under 
anesthesia. However, he stated in his letter that “I am mindful of the 
provisions of Section 3 of the Twenty-fifth Amendment to the 
Constitution and of the uncertainties of its application to such brief and 
temporary periods of incapacity. I do not believe that the drafters of the 
Amendment intended its application to situations such as the instant 
one.”34 Vice President George H.W. Bush held power temporarily as 
Acting President for eight hours before Reagan notified Congress that he 
was now able to resume the duties of the office. 
Fielding raised one other point about Reagan’s use of the amendment 
for his cancer surgery. Reagan had made clear, as the amendment 
provided, that he alone would be the judge of when he was sufficiently 
conscious and capable of resuming his official duties.35 Fielding, along 
with the chief of staff and the press secretary, went to see the surgeon after 
surgery had been completed and asked the surgeon how they could tell if 
30. Fielding, supra note 13, at 829-30. 
31. Id. at 830; Kassop, supra note 3, at 160. 
32. Kassop, supra note 3, at 160-61. 
33. Id. at 160. 
34. Id. 
35. Kassop, supra note 3, at 160. 
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the President was really ready to function again.36 The surgeon could not 
give them an answer. So, the four of them discussed this dilemma, and 
came up with a plan.37 They would ask Reagan to read the letter that he 
would send to Congress to resume his duties to see if he understood it. 
The doctor agreed that would be sufficient proof that the President was 
lucid enough to resume the duties of the office.38 
Fielding was questioned later as to whether this scheme 
inappropriately, and maybe even unconstitutionally, inserted him and the 
others into a decision that, constitutionally, was Reagan’s alone to make.39 
He responded that, in practice, he did not know how it could be otherwise. 
His point was that Presidential advisers or doctors or spouses are 
inevitably going to be drawn into making judgments about a President’s 
level of consciousness and whether he has his wits about him, aside from 
the President’s own conclusions.40 Thus, a presidential declaration of 
fitness to regain his powers will never, in Fielding’s words, “stand alone,” 
and “the role of any presidential adviser . . . is to evaluate the 
circumstances for the President and provide your judgment and your 
recommendation to the President.”41 
It then fell to George W. Bush to be the first President, arguably, who 
used the amendment exactly as it was intended when he twice underwent 
short colonoscopy procedures, first in 2002 and then again in 2007.42 
Alberto Gonzales was White House Counsel in 2002, and Fielding was 
back in the Counsel’s office for the 2007 procedure.43 Vice President 
Cheney was Acting President for about 2 hours each time (just long 
enough for some people to worry about how much mischief Cheney could 
do while holding the reins of power!).44 
Even here, Bush qualified his use of the amendment by noting that 
he was using it “because we are at war.” One wonders whether he would 
have refrained from using it for the same procedure if the nation had been 
at peace. Did the framers of the amendment intend that it should apply 
only during wartime, and not during peacetime?45 
36. Id. at 180-81. 
37. Id. 
38. Fielding, supra note 13, at 831. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. 
41. Fielding, supra note 13, at 832. 
42. Kassop, supra note 3, at 160. 
43. Id. at 183. 
44. Id. at 160.
45. Id. at 160-61. 
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What can we conclude, after fifty years of the amendment and of 
White House Counsels supervising its use? I offer some thoughts. 
First of all, we have never experienced a Section 4 use of the 
amendment, when government officials determine that a President is unfit 
to carry out the duties of the office. All of the uses to date have been of 
Sections 1 and 2 on a vice presidential vacancy, or Section 3 on the issue 
of a President’s own determination of his incapacity. 
Secondly, the pre-Amendment practice, started under Eisenhower, of 
informal agreements between a President and Vice President continued 
well after the amendment was ratified, at least through Clinton and Gore 
(and, possibly, George W. Bush and Obama continued that practice).46 
The purpose of these agreements was to add some clarity to the wishes of 
these Presidents and Vice Presidents, if they should be unconscious or 
incapable of acting on their own. The idea was that if basic principles 
could be agreed upon in advance by these leaders, with the knowledge and 
approval by their spouses and key White House staff members (the 
Counsel, the chief of staff and the White House physician), it would make 
application of those principles easier to accept at a difficult and critical 
time. This was wholly consistent with Senator Bayh’s explanation for 
including Section 4 in the amendment and with his expectation for how 
the implementation of Section 4 should evolve.47 Yet, many observers still 
note the need for even greater specificity as to the circumstances when 
Section 4 is likely to be needed. 
Third, the amendment has had an uneven history, with Reagan’s 
reluctance to embrace it fully, while George W. Bush followed it 
scrupulously and faithfully. As with just about any constitutional 
provision, how it is interpreted and implemented grows out of practices 
under it. Even at age fifty, the Twenty-fifth Amendment is still young and 
still experiencing growing pains. Fortunately for the country, we have not 
had many opportunities to give it room to grow. Thus, there is still much 
about how it might operate that remains open to question. 
Fourth, I would reiterate the two points I made earlier: 1) the 
paradoxical way in which Presidents (Reagan, specifically) have 
approached Section 3 of the amendment, resisting it because of the 
perception of weakness it might portray to the public; and 2) Reagan’s 
decision to follow the amendment’s procedures in Section 3 but without 
formally invoking it (“acting consistent with but not pursuant to”) is 
46. Id. at 149-50. 
47. Id at 162. 
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Exhibit A for presidential reticence and reluctance to embrace the 
amendment.48 
On the other hand, George W. Bush made his decision to activate the 
amendment after talking with Fielding and asking about the Reagan 
experience. Perhaps, all that really tells us is that it is a highly personal 
decision that each President needs to make, if and when the circumstances 
arise.49 
These four simple conclusions reinforce why the advice and 
guidance of a White House Counsel is so critical to a President’s—or 
another body’s—decision-making in such sensitive times. The President 
(and one day, perhaps the Cabinet or even a congressionally appointed 
body as an alternative provided in Section 4) depends on the Counsel for 
interpreting and translating the Constitution and the laws. The Counsel is 
where the process of determining implementation of the Twenty-fifth 
Amendment begins, and that office is also the place that monitors and 
guides every step of the process for each section of the amendment. To 
reiterate, the Counsel has the ever-challenging task of reconciling 
constitutional requirements with political calculations. Fielding’s early 
efforts in recognizing the amendment’s relevance in 1981 and 1985 
constituted a fitful start to the introduction of the amendment into political 
life, but it paved the way for stronger efforts by Counsels in subsequent 
administrations, as well as signaling that further deliberation was still 
needed to make the amendment effective. 
As for any speculation about how President Trump might approach 
Section 3 of the amendment, should that need arise, one might assume that 
since he has shown no inclination to listen to his White House Counsel on 
many other matters so far, there seems little reason to think he would start 
here, and there is every reason to think that giving up power, even 
temporarily, is definitely not in Trump’s DNA. 
For that matter, media outlets reported in October 2017 that former 
Trump strategist Steve Bannon warned Trump that impeachment was not 
the greatest risk to his presidency, but rather, a larger threat to his 
continuance in office loomed from the possibility of the use by his Cabinet 
of the Twenty-fifth Amendment. Trump reportedly responded, “What’s 
that?”50 
48. Id. at 160. 
49. Fielding, supra note 13, at 833. 
50. Gabriel Sherman, “I Hate Everyone in the White House!” Trump Seethes as Advisers fear 
the President is “Unraveling,” Vᴀɴɪᴛʏ Fᴀɪʀ, (Oct. 11, 2017), https://www.vanityfair.com/
news/2017/10/donald-trump-is-unraveling-white-house-advisers [https://perma.cc/JQ34-YKTL]. 
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Sections 3 and 4 of the Twenty-fifth Amendment are insurance 
policies for unpredictable and critical times. As with any insurance policy, 
one signs on to them as prudent and protective measures, while hoping 
they will never need to be used. The same is true for the nation and the 
assurance it gets from having constitutional provisions in place to guide it 
through a time of uncertainty. Let us keep in mind that constitutional 
provisions, such as those in the Twenty-fifth Amendment, provide a 
framework for action, but implementation of that framework depends 
wholly on government officials who carry out their duties in good faith. 
Perhaps, Fred Fielding offered the best view here when he said 
We have to place a layer of trust in our elected leaders and their 
advisers . . . to mind that any procedural gaps in a continuity crisis will 
be dealt with integrity and with the nation’s best interest at heart. . . . 
Even in the nation with the most able Constitution among all men, it will 
be no greater than the character and wisdom of the people [who] enforce 
it and are empowered to do so.51 
51. Fielding, supra note 13, at 834. 
